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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
M A L C O L M N. M c K I N N O N ,
Plaintiff-A

ppellant,

vs.
T H E CORPORATION OF T H E
PRESIDENT OF T H E CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a corporation,
Defendant-B espondent.

Case No.
13553

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE OF
T H E CASE
Plaintiff-appellant seeks money damages against
defendant-respondent arising out of respondent's breach
of legal duty to provide appellant with a haulage rightof-way to reach his substantial coal properties.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT
Respondent moved the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Ernest F . Baldwin,
1
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Jr., presiding, for Summary Judgment. At the hearing,
appellant requested leave to file an Amended Complaint
and to add or substitute parties defendant. The Court
granted respondent's motion for Summary Judgment
and denied appellant's motions to amend his Complaint
and to add or substitute parties.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's final
Amended Order dismissing appellant's Complaint,
denying appellant leave to file an Amended Complaint
and to add to or substitute parties and prays that this
Court order:
1. That the case be remanded to the district court
on its merits.
2. That appellant should be permitted to file his
Amended Complaint, and alternatively,
3. That appellant's motion to add or substitute
parties should be granted, if this Court should rule that
the suit is now pending against the wrong defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has been engaged in the business of coal
mining and coal sales for in excess of twenty-five years.
During all times herein pertinent he maintained large
blocks of coal properties in Emery County, Utah, in
his own name and in the name of his proprietorship,
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American Fuel Company. (McKinnon Deposition, pg.
5) Appellant was and is a member of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereinafter referred
to as the "Church") having been raised a member of this
religious organization. (R. 75) Respondent is a corporation sole and is the legal entity through which the
Church operates its various programs among which is
the General Church Welfare Program presided over
by a General Church Welfare Committee. (Peterson
Deposition, pg. 4)
In the early 1940's the Church began a concerted
effort to acquire coal properties to insure supply for
its welfare programs and for general Church operations. (Troseth Deposition, pg. 4) In 1958, Mr. Leonard
E . Adams was nominated General Manager of coal
properties of the General Church Welfare Committee
under the supervision of Henry D. Moyle. (McArthur
Deposition, pg. 7) Negotiations were thereafter conducted between appellant and the Church toward sale
of the entirety of appellant's Emery County coal properties to the Church but no agreement was reached.
(McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2) Subsequently,
Adams contacted appellant regarding the purchase by
the Church of 480 acres of fee coal land owned by
appellant. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 1) This
sale was consummated in 1959). (Exhibit 2P)
At that time, appellant had an applicant's interest
in contiguous coal properties owned by the United
States and managed by the Bureau of Land Manage-
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ment among which was a 640 acre parcel. (McKinnon
Deposition, Exhibit 5) Traversing the area adjacent
to the 480 acres were known faults and appellant was
retaining his preferential applicant's interest in the
contiguous 640 acres to provide a practical hallway
around the end of the fault should the fault penetrate
his then mining operations to provide access to a large
block of coal reserves he controlled. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2) At that time no one knew the exact
extent of the fault or faults and therefore control of
the 640 acres was absolutely critical to appellant's long
range mining plan. (Troseth Deposition, pg. 6)
In early 1959 Leonard Adams contacted appellant
on behalf of the General Church Welfare Committee to
determine if appellant would relinquish his interest in
the 640 acre preference parcel and assist the Church
in acquiring the B.L.M. lease thereon. (McKinnon
Deposition, Exhibit 1) Appellant indicated his willingness to assist his Church in this endeavor but only on
the express condition that he could reserve a right-ofway to guarantee him access around the fault to provide access to his other coal property. (McKinnon
Deposition, Exhibit 2) On March 12, 1959 Leonard
Adams wrote to plaintiff regarding the desire of the
Church to acquire the preference parcel and further
suggesting that appellant make a contribution to the
Church in the sum of $14,000.00. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2) Subsequently on March 17, 1959
appelant notified Adams that he would favorably
consider the proposal with this caveat:
4
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I would like to present a proposition, wherein
the Church applies for the acreage I asked for
in my lease modification, along with other acreage suitable to Church use, and after the lease
is granted, assign to me a portion of the land
I applied for in my lease modification. I need
a portion of this land in order to develop a practical haulage-way to the West that will go around
the end of the fault that is running in a Southwesterly direction and could cut me off if I do
not have some additional land to the South (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2).
Appellant then discussed the Church's proposal
with his attorney who in turn met with President Henry
D. Moyle. The attorney indicated that appellant was
agreeable to making this preference parcel available
to the Church and to make an additional contribution
of $14,000.00 if the Church would provide the rightof-way. The deposition of the attorney reveals the
following colloquy:
Q. During the initial discussion with President
Moyle did President Moyle make any response
to your request or suggestion?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Can you tell us your best recollection now of
what President Moyle said on that first occasion?
A. When he looked at the maps and after I got
through explaining them to him, he said, 'Well,
Frank, there's no problem there'. H e said, 'if
those faults extend into our ground we will
arrange to give him a right-of-way to go around
them.'
Q. And by 'we' did you understand him to mean
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the Corporation of the President of The Church
organization would grant to Mr. McKinnon that
right-of-way?
A. Yes, that's true (Armstrong deposition,,
p.8-9).
At the conclusion of the meeting President Moyle
stated to appellant's counsel "We will wait until we
get the lease and then we will prepare a right-of-way
for him." (Armstrong deposition, p. 10).
Appellant had been taught to believe by virtue of
the teachings received by him as a member of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints:
1. That the Church was divinely organized and
restored to the earth in this dispensation by Jesus
Christ himself and by other resurrected beings
acting directly under his supervision.
2. That one of the primary purposes and functions of the organization of the Church was to
provide an appropriate organization to assist all
men in attaining perfection in this life and hence
to earn the right to eternal life and exaltation.
3. That Henry D. Moyle, with whom he dealt
and upon whom he relied in the transactions
here involved, was not only an authorized agent
and General Authority of the Church, but more
especially a direct representative of God and
that Leonard Adams and Alfred Uhrhan, the
other Church representatives with whom he dealt
and upon whom he relied, were authorized agents
or representatives of the Church.
4. That the honesty and integrity of the Church
and its General Authorities, its officers, its
agents, and representative, including Henry D.
6
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Moyle, Leonard Adams, and Alfred Uhrhan
was wholly beyond repute and unimpeachable
and for him to consider otherwise would be
heresy.
5. That the welfare program of the Church
which was to be the repository of the coal properties here involved was inspired of the Lord
and was an important and vital program of the
Church. (R. 76)
Appellant's counsel reported the substance of his
conversations with President Moyle and appellant thereafter prepared two checks totalling $14,000.00 made
payable to the Church and abandoned his interest in
the preference parcel sought by the Church. Appellant
subsequently wrote a letter to President Moyle indicating that he was holding the $14,000.00 donation and
desired to have the formal right-of-way documented
"in accordance with the understanding (Moyle) had
with (appellant's counsel)." (McKinnon deposition,
Exhibit 7). At no time did President Moyle or any
other representative of the Church dispute or deny the
understanding reached between Moyle acting for the
Church and appellant's counsel.
The checks were then delivered by counsel to
President Moyle, who stated "We will hold these checks
until we can give you the right-of-way and until we
get the lease from the Government." (Armstrong
deposition, p. 13). The two checks totalling $14,000.00
were handed by President Moyle to the Secretary of
the General Church Welfare Committee, Alfred W.
Uhrhan, who placed them in an envelope and wrote
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on the cover "hold two checks totalling $14,000.00
Malcolm McKinnon tendered for right-of-way. This
matter is pending." (McKinnon deposition, Exhibit
12). Appellant then assisted the Church in acquiring
the 640 acre parcel and although several requests were
made by appellant for a memorialization of the rightof-way agreement, none was ever forthcoming and in
1966 the Church leased the 640 acres to Peabody Coal
Company without reserving the promised right-of-way
to appellant. Respondent's Exhibit "A", pg. 38 and
40)
The Church maintains a recognized internal procedure through which Church members may bring
grievances before the Church. (Curtis Deposition, pg.
13-14) Upon being apprised of the transfer of the
property by the Church to Peabody Coal Company,
appellant sought to take advantage of this ecclesiastical
grievance procedure. (Curtis Deposition, pg. 15) H e
presented his claim through his own Bishop, Stake
President and a close friend who was also a Stake
President and eventually met personally with President
N. Eldon Tanner of the First Presidency of the Church
in the company of both his attorney and one of the
Stake Presidents. (Armstrong Deposition, pg. 18)
President Tanner was unable to explain the retention
by the Church of the $14,000.00 donation and indicated
to those present that appellant's grievance should be
put "at rest" until appellant found out whether he could
go around the fault on his own property. (Armstrong
Deposition, pg. 20) It is undisputed that the procedure
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followed by appellant was the recognized grievance
procedure for a member's claim against the Church.
(Curtis Deposition, pg. 14-15) No right-of-way has
ever been granted appellant. (McKinnon Deposition,
pg. 55)

ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
T H E E X I S T E N C E OF D I S P U T E D ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACTS PRECLUDES T H E
GRANTING OF SUMMARY J U D G M E N T AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
It is axiomatic that Summary Judgment is improper when there exist disputed issues of material
facts. Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United
Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) ;
Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity & Guarantee
Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398
P.2d 685 (1965). The appellant submits that the lower
court erred in granting respondent Summary Judgment as there exist in this matter a plethora of disputed
factual issues and, more particularly, that the grounds
set forth in the Amended Order dismissing appellant's
Complaint are insufficient when viewed as they must be
on appeal in a light most favorable to appellant. Morris
v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297
(1953). The lower court set them forth as follows:
A. The defendant is not a proper defendant;
9
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B. The cause of action is barred by the Utah
Statute of Limitations; and
C. The issue of damages is either moot or not susceptible to legal determination (R. 10).
Each of these enumerated bases involves genuine
issues and as there has been no showing by respondent
which precludes as a matter of law the awarding of any
relief to appellant, Tan/tier v. Utah Poultry k Farmers
Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961);
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah
2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960) summary relief is improper.

A. P R O P E R P A R T Y D E F E N D A N T
ARGUMENT
Respondent avers and the lower Court agreed that
respondent "The Corporation of The President of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" is not a
proper party defendant. Appellant submits that respondent is the proper party defendant, or in the
alternative, that appellant should have been granted
opportunity on motion duly made, accepted but denied
by the Court below, to add or substitute parties defendant. I t is undisputed that all of appellant's contacts
during the formation of the underlying agreement which
gave rise to this action were with representatives of The
Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Appellant and appellant's agents met with Henry
10
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D. Moyle, an agent and employee of The Corporation
of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, who struck the bargain whereby
appellant would transfer to respondent appellant's
interest in the 640 acre preference parcel and respondent
would grant appellant a haulage right-of-way across
the property should the need arise. (Armstrong Deposition, pg. 9) In a prelude to this contractual relationship, appellant had sold respondent 480 acres of fee
property and had received in payment therefor a check
drawn on respondent The Corporation of the President
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
(Exhibit 2P) In furtherance of this agreement,
appellant made a $14,000.00 contribution payable to
"The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" and
it is beyond cavil that the The Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
is the legal entity which holds title to property donated
in its name or to the name of the "Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints".
Respondent contended during argument that it
was not a proper party defendant and that the proper
party defendant was Cooperative Security Corporation.
(Respondent's Opening Brief, pg. 6) At no time did
appellant have any contact with employees or representatives of Cooperative Security Corporation; his
exclusive contact was with representatives of respondent, more particularly: Leonard Adams, the then
General Manager of the Church Coal Mine Properties;
Henry D. Moyle, a Second Counselor in The Church
11
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of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and Alfred W .
Uhrhan, an employee of the General Church Welfare
Committee. (Peterson Deposition, pg. 7) It is true
that the Cooperative Security Corporation was the legal
entity which eventually took title to the 640 acres which
appellant transferred to respondent as its designee but
appellant is not required to bring this action against
respondent's nominee or designee. Appellant has never
contended or effectuated any contractual relationship
with Cooperative Security Corporation.
From the statement of the Trial Judge below at
hearing (R. 10), we assume that he deemed the appropriate party defendant to be the "Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints", an unincorporated association,
and, consequently, that both appellant and respondent
were in error as to the proper identity of the defendant.
In any event, appellant, without waiving his position
that the "Corporation of the President" was the proper
party defendant, moved to be permitted to add the
"Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints", an
unincorporated association, Cooperative Security Corporation, and any other legal entity pressed by the Court
or respondent as substitute or additional defendants.
That motion, although accepted by the Court, was
denied on its merits.
If this Court determines that the "Corporation of
the President" is not the proper party defendant, then
it must further rule that the Court below erred in not
granting the motion of appellant to add or substitute
12
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parties. Otherwise, form would certainly triumph over
substance and manifest injustice would prevail. If the
Trial Judge had asked for the real defendant to stand,
it would have been the same "body" whether in the form
of the "Corporation of the President", the unincorporated association, Cooperative Security Corporation or
some other controlled pseudonym or designee. Such
a charade of musical chairs should be beneath the dignity
of a self-declared agent of deity, and, even applying
general principles of law and equity which are less
divine, would, if successful, shock the conscience and
defy the most primitive concepts of fairness and justice.1
It follows that the Court below erred grievously
and that the Judgment must be reversed.
B. T H E C L A I M E D B A R O F T H E S T A T U T E OF LIMITATIONS
The second ground enumerated by the lower court
in dismissing appellant's Complaint was that the cause
of action is barred by the four (4) year Utah Statute
of Limitations, §78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated. Even
the most cursory review of the record indicates beyond
question that appellant raised significant factual issues
which preclude respondent from beneficial reliance on
the Statute of Limitations.
1. First is the existence of the special fiduciary
1 No religious bias should be assumed from the foregoing argument for its scrivener is an active member in good standing of
the same church.
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relationship between appellant and respondent. This
was not, by any means, an ordinary business transaction. Appellant in his untraversed affidavit states:
That the entire transaction which is the subject
of this controversy was colored by the Church
and its self-declared mission as described generally herein, his membership therein and his
belief and faith in its mission, purpose, honesty
and integrity, together with that of its officers,
agents, and representatives. (R. 77)
It is undisputed that appellant would not have
dealt with respondent at all and would not have performed any of the acts which gave rise to this controversy but for the existence of the special fiduciary
relationship. Appellant had been engaged for years
in the coal business and recognized the necessity of
maintaining access to his properties. However, when
appellant was approached by Leonard Adams and the
negotiations were conducted with Henry D. Moyle,
appellant was dealing with what he believed to be the
direct representative of God (R. 76) and further
believed that the welfare program of the Church which
was to be the repository of the coal properties here
involved was inspired of the Lord and was an important
and vital program of the Church. (R. 76) Because of
appellants' belief and faith he did not take the precautions in dealing with respondent in this transaction
as he would have taken in dealing with mere mortals
or their institutions. (R. 76)
Appellant had been induced by respondents' own
specific teachings to believe that he was dealing with
14
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God's chosen representative in aid of God's special
purposes. H e had been led to believe by the Church
itself that the contiguous preferred mining properties
as to which he held a preference and which were absolutely necessary to the future mining of his properties
were critically needed by the Church's inspired welfare
program. Appellant was a member in good standing of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and
as such had been taught that Henry D. Moyle, as a
member of the First Presidency, was a person directly
revelating with God on behalf of the Church and for
the guidance and protection of all members of the
Church, including appellant. (R. 76) This special and
unique relationship removed respondent's agents from
the mundanities of every day business transactions and
placed all of the dealings between appellant and respondent on a higher plane.
Under special confidential relationships such as
those here controlling, the courts have removed the
otherwise protective umbrella of Statute of Limitations.
One case is Atlas Corporation v. Mag dam, 130 Nebraska 519, 265 N.W. 473 (1936), involving the relationship between a bank and one of its managing officers. The Court held at 265 N.W. 746:
W e are of the opinion that defendant Magdanz
(manager) is estopped as against the bank and
its assignee to plead either the Statute of Frauds
or Limitations. Magdanz was cashier and active
manager of the bank. H e had charge of the note
as such officer and it was his duty to enforce
payment when due or report the situation to the
15
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Board of Directors for instructions. Instead of
performing his duty, he made the endorsement
and thereby concealed the fact that the note was
due. H e should not now be permitted to take
advantage of his wrong.
The attorney-client relationship is of like confidential nature and courts have precluded counsel from
relying upon the Statute of Limitations when suit is
brought by a disenchanted client. In Strangman v.
Arc-Saws, 267 P.2d 395 (Cal. App. 1954), an action
was initiated against an attorney by an ex-client who
had been solicited by the attorney to invest money in
a corporation in which the attorney was an officer and
director. The attorney had concealed from the client
the existence of the attorney's relationship with the
corporation. The Court denied the attorney the defense
of Statute of Limitations. See also Waugh v. Lennard,
69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949).
In a somewhat analogous case to the facts here
presented, the California Appellate Court in Brown
v. World Church, 77 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1969), considered
a case wherein the Church through its pastor had borrowed money from a parishioner and for an extended
period of time the Church and minister repeatedly
advised Mrs. Brown that her note was secure, that she
need not contact counsel to collect the note and that
if any person sued, it would become a sin against the
Church and that she should have faith in her ministers.
When suit was finally initiated, defendant Church and
the ministers raised the defense of Statute of Limi-

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tations. The Court summarily estopped both from asserting this defense.
Appellant's state of mind is a factual issue which
must be determined by the trier of fact and until such
a determination as to the existence of a fiduciary relationship is made, no Summary Judgment can lie against
him.
2. The defense of Statute of Limitations is also
non apropos and not available to respondent because
respondent's conduct in persuading appellant to seek
redress through respondent's grievance procedures
lulled appellant into a false sense of security as appellant reasonably believed the breach of agreement by
respondent had occurred because of an innocent mistake on the part of respondent and its officers and representatives and that the same could be and would be
rectified through the internal grievance procedure of
the Church. (R. 77)
Appellant initiated his contacts with the Church
prior to the running of any applicable Statute of Limitations. One of the Church's authorized representatives
characterized appellant's efforts in this regard as being
consistent with its internal practice and policy. (Curtis
Deposition, pg. 15) However, rather than promptly
denying the claim to demonstrate to appellant the hopelessness of this procedure, respondent entreated appellant to hold the matter in abeyance for an indefinite
period. (Armstrong Deposition, pg. 20) It was not until
after the four (4) year Statute of Limitations had run
17
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that respondent, for the first time, indicated to appellant
that respondent had no intention of granting him redress
through this procedure.
This Court has enunciated its displeasure as to such
conduct in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d
22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), at 22 Utah 2d 28:
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary
into a false sense of security thereby subjecting
his claim to the bar of limitations and then be
heard to plead that very delay as a defense to
the action when brought. Acts or conduct which
wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of his claim will be made may create
an estoppel against the pleading of the Statute
of Limitations.
Rice, is, if possible, a weaker case than appellant's because in Rice only negotiations to compromise a claim
were involved, whereas in appellant's situation, the
equities weigh much heavier in his favor.
Again, the intention of the parties and the existence
of confidential and fiduciary relationships between them
are matters of factual determination at a trial upon
the merits and summary denial of such claims is error.
O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799
(1970). See also Davis v. Dyer, 56 N . H . 143 (1875),
wherein the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a case
involving a suit between a parishioner and his Church
where the Church's arbitration policy was first invoked
held at 56 N . H . 146:
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If in fact the plaintiff was induced to postpone
bringing his suit by the agreement of the defendant to refer and to perform the award for the
period of time during which his legal right to
commence a suit was thus put in abeyance by
the agreement, I see no reason why that does
not amount to an estoppel in pias which must
prevent the defendants from availing themselves
of the fact that the cause of action did not accrue
within six years to defeat the action. However
strong the probabilities on that subject may
appear, the Court cannot say as a matter of law
the fact was so. (Emphasis added)
Furthermore, appellant's affidavit on this subject
was uncontroverted. It follows then, for the purpose of
motion for Summary Judgment, the Court below was
legally bound to find the existence, not the absence, of
this confidential and fiduciary relationship as a matter
of law.
It should be noted that plaintiff* did not proceed
directly with his internal appeal through the grievance
procedure of respondent simply out of an election of
remedies; he did so because he had been informed and
believed that the Church always strived to solve its
problems internally and never brought such internal
problems to light outside of its confines. (Curtis Deposition, pg. 14) At a meeting conducted in the presence
of then President N. Eldon Tanner, appellant and his
attorney presented the facts surrounding his claim.
President Tanner did not deny the claim and, on the
contrary, suggested that the matter be tabled until such
time as the actual situs of the fault could be ascertained.
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At such subsequent time, Tanner promised, the Church
would again review the matter. (Curtis Deposition,
p. 11)
An analogous case wherein a member of an organization availed himself of internal grievance procedures
and thereby failed to file his civil action within the
appropriate limitation period is Van Hook v. Southern
California Waiters Alliance, 323 P.2d 212 (1958). In
Van Hook the general secretary of the local union was
offered other employment and so advised the union. The
union thereupon granted him an extensive retirement
program. Subsequently, the secretary lost a re-election
bid and notified the union of his intent to secure the
retirement program. Defendant thereupon refused to
comply with its agreement and the matter was submitted
through the union's internal arbitration procedures.
After the Statute of Limitations had run for filing a
civil action, plaintiff filed a civil complaint and defendant union raised the defense of Statute of Limitations.
The Court summarily denied defendant the right to
claim the benefit of the Statute and held at 323 P.2d
219:
By its conduct herein the defendant lulled plaintiff into a sense of false security in implying
that by proceeding through the successive steps
of appeal provided by the constitution of the
International Union his claim might be recognized or a settlement reached. 'It is well settled
that where delay in commencing an action is induced by conduct of the defendant, he cannot
avail himself of the defense of statute of limitations.'
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C. T H E C O U R T B E L O W E R R E D A S A
M A T T E R O F L A W I N I T S CONCLUSIONS A S
TO " D A M A G E S . ' '
The final ground enumerated by the lower court
in granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is a statement that appellant having "leased his
property without any dimunition in price to the owner
of the property through which the alleged right-of-way
was to be granted, makes the issues of damages either
moot or not susceptible to legal determination." (R.
10) This simply is not the fact!
Summary Judgment is not the proper vehicle for
ascertaining damages. The lower court's determination
to resolve damages prior to receiving any testimony
from witnesses, lay or expert, takes from the trier of
fact one of its fundamental duties. It is a touchstone
of our judicial system that the determination and assessment of damages is peculiarly within the province of
the jury. Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d
166 (1965); Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated,
15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964). The proper
method of determining damages is to put appellant in
the position he would have been but for the breach of
contract by respondent.
It is clear that the lower court's abrupt resolution
of the damage issue is not proper; it, in no respect,
attempts to determine the position in which plaintiff
would have been had there been no breach. The damage
question necessitates a finding of fact and the existence
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of such factual issue precludes Summary Judgment on
the damage issue. Elrod v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company, Des Moines, Iowa, 201 Kan. 254,
440 P.2d 544 (1968).
Appellant submits that summary resolution by the
lower court of each of the material factual issues raised
herein was improper and that the existence of such
issues mandates a remand of this matter for trial before
a trier of fact. No other decision by this Court would
satisfy appellant's right to trial of these issues on their
merits.

POINT II.
A P P E L L A N T SHOULD H A V E B E E N ALL O W E D TO A M E N D H I S C O M P L A I N T TO
AVER T H E E X I S T E N C E AND BREACH OF
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
It is uncontroverted that respondent obtained the
640 acres through which appellant sought his haulage
right-of-way by means of the underlying agreement
with appellant. Respondent did so with full knowledge
of the confidential relationship existing between itself
and appellant as hereinabove set forth. Respondent
obtained this property subject to a specific condition:
The granting to appellant of the promised right-of-way.
Respondent subsequently transferred the property
without reserving such right-of-way to appellant. As
a direct and proximate result of the actions of respond-
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ent, a constructive trust resulted covering the leasehold
property with appellant as beneficiary.
The existence of the constructive trust is implicit
in the allegations of fact contained in the original Complaint and it does not constitute a new cause of action.
The decision of the lower court in denying appellant
the opportunity to so amend is contrary to the interest
of justice and serves no useful function but to frustrate
a full hearing on the merits of the controversy. The
amendment sought is proper and should have been permitted. Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 Pac. 885
(1913) ; Fell v. Union Pac. By. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88
Pac. 1003 (1907).
This Court should allow the amendment alleging
the existence and the breach of the constructive trust
which arose from the fact setting of the original Complaint as a matter of law. Respondent cannot claim to
have been prejudiced by the amendment because respondent has had notice from the beginning of this
lawsuit that appellant was seeking enforcement of a
claim arising out of the breach of respondent's agreement to provide the right-of-way. The language of
the United States Supreme Court in Tiller v. Atlantic
Coastline Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945), although
written in a different factual context, is applicable here.
In that suit, an action was commenced under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for a death resulting
from negligence; it was held that an amendment to
the complaint was properly permitted to state an addi23
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tional ground of negligence.
U.S. 581:

The Court held at 323

The cause of action now, as it was in the beginning, is the same—it is a suit to recover damages
for the wrongful death of the deceased. 'The
effect of the amendment here was to facilitate
a fair trial of the existing issues between plaintiff and defendant.' Maty v. Grasselli Chemical
Co., 303 U S 197. There is no reason to apply a
statute of limitations when, as here, the respondent has had notice from the beginning that petitioner was trying to enforce a claim against it
because of the events leading up to the death of
the deceased in the respondent's yard.
Appellant has sustained damage as a result of
respondent's breach of the constructive trust. When
respondent sold the trust property in breach of the
constructive trust it did so to the substantial detriment
of the beneficiary, appellant. The determination of such
damage is more particularly described in Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, Sec. 208 (1) (b) providing that
when a trustee sells property which is its duty to retain,
the beneficiary can "charge him with the value at the
time of the decree, with the income which would have
accrued thereon if he had not sold it or require him
to make specific reparation if this is reasonable under
the circumstances." (Emphasis added)
To now allow respondent to transfer this property
free of the right-of-way agreement would constitute
an unjust enrichment to respondent because respondent
has received monetary consideration for the transfer
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from Peabody Coal Company. This Court has recognized the availability of constructive trust in similar
fact situations, that such trust arises by operation of
law and that sitting as a court of equity, the lower court
is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar
to each transaction whenever a failure to perform a
duty to convey property would result in unjust enrichment. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229
(1949). It should do so here.

POINT III.
A P P E L L A N T S M O T I O N TO A M E N D TO I N C L U D E A CLAIM FOR P U N I T I V E DAMAGES WAS PROPER.
Appellant sought permission from the lower court
to file an Amended Complaint asserting an additional
claim for punitive damages based upon the gross and
aggravated nature of respondents breach of agreement
and of its duties as constructive trustee and further
avering the breaches to have been willful and malicious
in nature. The motion was based upon facts developed
through discovery after filing of the original Complaint
which demonstrated the grievous nature of respondent's
action and the inconsistency between its conduct toward
appellant and its self-declared mission and the precepts
which it espouses and which it expects from its many
members including this appellant.
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This breach arose out of a relationship of strictest
confidentiality and highest trust in that appellant has
been continually assured and reassured by representatives of respondent that the Church would never act
consciously in such a manner as to cause injury to a
member such as himself and that a member should
believe in the promises of such representatives implicitly.
This claim for punitive damages in no way states
a new cause of action and does not prejudice respondent
in its defense of this action. It is merely a new element
of damages having its source in the same occurrence
as were the subject of the original Complaint. See
Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 47 F.R.D. 148
(1969). The Court erred in refusing to allow the amendment.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has presented this Court with a compendium of the material factual issues which had not
been resolved and which existed at the time of the precipitous action of the trial court in granting Summary
Judgment. Appellant has further shown that no
grounds or bases whatsoever existed for the court below
to deny appellant the opportunity to present his cause
to a trier of fact. Appellant respectfully submits that
the decision of the lower court must be reversed and
this matter remanded for trial on its merits, with appellant being permitted to amend his Complaint to aver
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the existence and breach of a constructive trust and
for punitive damages as well as opportunity to add or to
substitute parties defendant if required.
Respectfully submitted,
Keith E. Taylor
LeRoy S. Axland
of and for
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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